On the 24th of February, the Deputy Health Minister of Iran Iraj Harirchi reported at the national press-conference. After the short notice about 50 cases in the religious city of Qom, he denied their correlation with coronavirus. Amidst his emotional speech, where he was claiming that he would resign from his post if this number was true, he began sweating so intensively, that he had to repeatedly wipe his forehead with a handkerchief. He looked feverish and very nervous.

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The next day, he announced that he tested positive for coronavirus via a video posted on social media. If before he was saying that the virus is not that dangerous and the country does not need quarantine, now his opinion changed blatantly. He urged people to take care of each other and their closest ones, and to consider that the disease “does not distinguish between statesmen and ordinary citizens”.

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For many people this announcement has turned to be a cold shower: the infection of the official implies that the virus spread had already been wider than indicated. The tipping point, when the government could have made the necessary announcements about the disease and effected relevant measures, had already passed.

 

The regular Iranians are frightened for their lives, while other news slowly unearth. Vice President Masoumeh Ebtekar tested positive for coronavirus, after attending a meeting with the president Rouhani. A month later, 31 members of the Parliament were found to be infected and there already have been several deaths among important figures. However, the announcements of their deaths have been deleted from the Internet.

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Meanwhile, the number of cases is increasing by an alarming rate. The massive graves visible from the satellite image near the religious city of Qom suggest that the Iranian death toll is much higher than one might expect. Nevertheless, the government has been ignoring the necessity of an immediate lockdown and has not taken any urgent actions. Here appears a fair question: why was the coronavirus quarantine in Iran announced with so much delay?

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From a comparison with the Chinese response to COVID-19 there appears a pattern: in the first weeks of the outbreak, both countries implemented censorship and co-optation in an attempt to deny the crisis. We argue that authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran are highly concerned with projecting an image of power and control, thus they were more reluctant to recognize the scale of the problem and to impose quarantine. Faced with a trade-off between the citizens’ safety and their own popularity, they favoured the second.

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A Virus is Nothing Against the Tradition

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The most popular explanation of the late quarantine in Iran is, unsurprisingly, linked to the nature of the Islamic state. Western media, together with official statements of Iranian officials themselves, corroborate this point of view: Iranians were too reluctant to give up on their traditional routine, presented by Friday prayers, travelling between the cities during national holidays and pilgrimage to the holy places. The weekly prayers turned out to be a trap - the number of prayers is enormous, and the infected people played the role of a "timely bomb" in the later outbreak.

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Furthermore, visiting holy places (particularly the city of Qom) could not be abandoned by the Iranians. These shrines have vast importance for the Iranians and Shia Muslims globally, mainly because of the healing power attributed to these places. Interestingly, the COVID-19 "patient zero" has died in the city of Qom, but that did not stop visitors. What is more - coronavirus is perceived by some believers as a challenge to their faith. The government recently has caught a hooligan, who was licking the shrines on video exclaiming: "I will eat the virus, so others will be safe." When the government tried to close Qom it sparked national unrest, so the officials removed the restriction. The same happened with the ban on bazaars and local travels on Nowruz’ eve.

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Detrimental US sanctions for the Iranian economy

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According to the international hostility narrative, the US sanctions were the main reason why Iran simply could not afford imposing quarantine. After pulling back from the nuclear treaty agreement, Trump reinforced the economic sanctions against Iran. Despite the US claim that the sanctions do not disrupt the flow of humanitarian aid to Iran, most of the countries are afraid of cooperation with Tehran. This attitude extends to banking, too. Recently Iran has asked the IMF for 5 billion dollars to recover from the coronavirus impact. But since the US is the leading state within the organization, the chances of Tehran to receive this money are minuscule.

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The Iranian economy would not be able to sustain itself if they closed all banks and offices. Tourism and trade are the cornerstones of the Iranian economy, so the border and pilgrimage places were difficult to close. Tehran neither wanted to lose China - its main economic partner, nor the revenue from the Shia pilgrimage. That is why, from this perspective, Iran can be considered rather a victim of circumstances, a subject of the US "economic terrorism".

 

The Authoritarian Regime

 

“Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.”

George Orwell, 1984

 

In a recent article for the New York Times, Max Fisher described Iran’ political regime as a broadly authoritarian government that over the years oscillated among degrees of democracy. In 2019, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Iran 151st in the world in democracy index. It was more authoritarian than Cuba, Russia, Egypt and Venezuela, and just a span more democratic than China, ranked 153rd. But what does it mean to be authoritarian in the XXI century?

 

According to the Informational Autocrats theory, the time of terror and totalitarianism has passed. Today’s authoritarian regimes are more interested in projecting a powerful image both domestically and internationally. One could argue - legitimately - that this is not exclusive for authoritarian regimes. Every politician desires to project a positive image, every government wishes to appear in control on the international stage. The substantial difference rests in the leader’s abilities to do so. In Iran, criticism is not allowed. The political elite is not held accountable at the election. The grief of those whose closest ones died because of government inefficiency will be private. It will find no place in the public sphere - that is a monopoly of the government. The most important instrument in the hands of such regimes is propaganda, reinforced through censorship, co-optation and the “informed elite” monopoly of political knowledge (Guriev, 2019).

 

While both democratic and non-democratic states can exercise censorship, only the latter can generate discourses and practices that establish pervasive control of what individuals or groups may say or do in a public setting (Rahimi, 2015). According to reports from the Open Net Initiative, Censorship in Iran is among the strictest in the world. In the past few years, Iran saw a rapid increase in censorship. From the 163rd position in the world for press freedom in 2018, it moved all the way to the 170th in just one year. According to Reporters Without Borders estimations, at least 860 journalists and citizen-journalists have been imprisoned or executed since 1979. More recently, just a month ago the Center for Human Right in Iran denounced increasing violence against journalist ahead of the elections. They also reported that “only a few journalists have publicly spoken about the raids on their homes by IRGC agents. Those in cities other than Tehran have been especially careful not to talk about them due to pressure from state agents”.

 

If being a journalist or a political dissident in Iran is dangerous, keeping oneself updated is perilous too. Iranian control over the internet is reported to be one of the highest in the globe. The whole system is based on co-optation and threats. Supporting the government is highly rewarding, whereas doubting the “official truth” is very costly. As a consequence, a pervasive culture of pleasing appears (Guriev and Treisman, 2019). Its mechanism is similar to that of a violent relationship. Violence is almost never just physical and usually based on economic control and psychological brutality. The abused are so accustomed to the punishment/reward mechanism and to the arbitrariness of their partner that they develop a culture of pleasing, where every conflictual action is avoided.

 

In Iran, the acknowledgement of the COVID-19 was so dangerous that even the deputy minister of health refused to admit his symptoms. As an anonymous Iranian told us, “when we talk about a system it is a network of people who know the game rules. It is an example of pleasing in the system. And in return, you get support in the form of job, money, power, support against law and so on”.

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From China to Iran: History Repeats Itself

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China was the first country to be hit by Coronavirus, so it was faced by the outbreak in a very different condition than Iran. From an ideological stance, Iran is based on religion, while the PRC is based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology permeated with Confucianism. Furthermore, their levels of economic strength, modernization, international activity, ingrained institutions, mobilization forces and of trust among elites are different.

 

The only unifying feature is the political regime, implying informational autocracy. And it is precisely this common characteristic that brought both regimes to delay the imposition of quarantine. Although the first coronavirus cases in China were reported quite early (December), the government did not announce it for the first three weeks. The doctors that have been trying to report about the deadly nature of the virus were accused of “spreading rumours” and forced to revoke their own testimonies. Even after President Xi Jinping’s order to limit the spread of the virus, the government was reluctant to announce that the virus can spread between humans. Meanwhile, with the Chinese New Year was approaching, around 5 million people had already left Wuhan province. Only on January 23rd, the government locked down Wuhan, Beijing and other major cities.

 

In terms of silencing and cooptation, it is still possible to see its relevance in the current production of information on COVID-19. As PhD candidate Francesco Sassi underlined, in China “a government’s agency has just recently issued a statement for which all scientific publications trying to trace the origins of the coronavirus must be “strictly managed” and overseen by a central government official before being submitted for publication. The same seems to happen in Iran, where reports emerged about the government limiting the publishing of statistics that contradict or question official ones.”

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Therefore, the late quarantine might be explained by the incompetent authoritarian government, which was trying to maintain control over the population. Because of the constant surveillance and censorship, the news reaching the local authorities were disregarded and downgraded – all to please the higher standing officials. Thus, what made both China and Iran fail to address the coronavirus immediately was the leaders’ exceptional willingness to project the image of power on their own population. As Sassi noted, not only Iran but all authoritarian regimes “have the necessity and possibility to single out policies which are increasing the legitimacy of the ruling élite during this pandemic outbreak”.

 

From the Ukrainian Jet to the Oil Prices: a Difficult Year for Iran

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In the past few months, the Iranian regime was faced by two challenges that shaped the context in which the COVID-19 outbreak took place. What happened is both relevant because of its consequences on the regime and because it exemplifies the power of the propaganda machine.

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On November 13th, under the US sanctions pressure, President Rouhani announced that the country faced a deficit that amounted to nearly two-thirds of the yearly budget of $45 billion. Two days later, the Iranian state television broadcasted his decision to increase by 50% the fuel prices, which were historically subsidized. The decision led to intense protest all over the country, with reported demonstrations in 70% of the provinces. A few months later, The Independent referred to these manifestations as “the largest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution”. The wave of protest was violently repressed. Human Rights Watch reported that “more than 100 protesters are believed to be killed. The National Security Council has also ordered the shutdown of the country’s internet since the evening of November 15”. On November 17th, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that “some people are no doubt worried by this decision ... but sabotage and arson is done by hooligans, not our people” (Reuters, 2019).

 

The fuel-price case showed all the power of the Iranian propaganda machine. While the internet blackout was not a first, the scale of the shutdown was unprecedented. As Vox noted, “With their own intranet, Iran was able to keep vital infrastructures running like hospitals and banks, while completely denying access to the only two global internet portals in Iran because both of the gateways are owned by the government”. By these means, the government repressed the protests, both obstructing activists’ organization and delaying the international circulation of news, in the ultimate attempt to preserve its image of control over the population.

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Unlike the fuel price protest, the Ukrainian Jet was first and foremost a diplomatic catastrophe. It took place in the midst of the 2019-2020 Persian Gulf Crisis, five days after the US launched a drone strike killing Iranian major general Soleimani. On January the 8th, the Boeing 737-800 was shot down shortly after takeoff from Tehran International Airport. All 176 passengers and crew were killed, including 82 Iranians, 57 Canadians, 11 Ukrainians and others from Sweden, Afghanistan and the UK. The chronology of the first few days was somehow similar to that of COVID-19. First, the regime denied shooting down the airplane. “We are at a point that satellite images can read out plate numbers - said Rouhani spokesman and adviser Ali Rabiei - so if there was a missile hitting a plane, the footage would have been available”. Just a few days later, Tehran was forced to admit the error, but it tried to transfer responsibility. Iran's foreign minister tweeted that it was a "sad day" but that U.S. "adventurism" had caused the disaster (Npr, 2020).

 

In the meantime, the BBC reported a new spark of manifestation. Thousands of protesters took to the street demanding the resignation of President Hassan Rouhani and criticising Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with chants of “death to the dictator" (The Independent, 2020). Shortly after, videos of protesters being violently repressed started spreading on social media (Dw, 2020). In a few months span, the regime was faced with two waves of protests, so its legitimacy was heavily undermined. In this context, the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for February 21 became more important than ever.

 

A vote of confidence

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According to Iran’s electoral law, any candidate must be a supporter of the Islamic Republic, a practising Muslim and not have a “notorious reputation”. Furthermore, a candidate will be disqualified if he/she is found to be actively supporting the Shah or supporting political parties and organizations deemed illegal or been charged with anti-government activity, converted to another faith, has otherwise renounced the Islamic faith, or have been found guilty of violating Sharia law. The list of requirements goes on, profiling the portrait of the perfect candidate. To sum up, what is really needed to run for election is an approval stamp from the government. Consequently, these are not democratic elections. They are part of the “mimicking democracy” strategy and participate in the propaganda, corroborating the image of power of the regime.

 

On the 21st of February, Iranians were not called to choose their government. Nonetheless, the parliamentary elections were as important for the regime as they would be for the incumbent party of a democratic country. "It is not a free election of course" -says an Iranian in our interview - "but they want the show. They want to show the world that Iranian people support the regime in Iran and participate in elections”.

 

After the difficult year of 2019, when Iran saw the most extensive protests in decades, it was crucial for the government to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the population and the world. As journalist Parisa Hafezi put it, “with Iran facing growing isolation and threats of conflict over its nuclear standoff with the US, and increasing discontent at home, the turnout is seen as a referendum on the popularity of the Islamic Republic’s rulers”.

 

By the end of January, when alarming news of suspect cases of COVID-19 started circulating in Iran, the government was not willing to accept the problem. That would have meant to impose unpopular measures, with the risk of fueling discontent just a few weeks before elections. It would have made voting more complex and time-consuming, thus discouraging people from participating. As a senior official put it “the last thing we needed was a pandemic. The mood was already down” (Reuters, 2020).

 

In the end, hiding the cases was not enough. With a turnout of 42%, the regime lost almost a third of its supporters from 2016, with 62% of voters. Khamenei's comment on the results confirmed the efforts of the regime in silencing information on COVID-19. In fact, he blamed the low turnout on the “negative propaganda” about the new coronavirus by Iran’s enemies. “This negative propaganda about the virus began a couple of months ago and grew larger ahead of the election,” said Khamenei (Reuters, 2020).

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The “Coronavirus effect”

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In times of crisis, the clock of history speeds up, and the reality appears blurred as a video played fast forward. While we write, half of humanity is confined to their homes, the productive machine of capitalist economy has almost stopped, and borders all around the world are sealed up. What now seems normal was simply unthinkable just a few weeks ago. The Worldometer website shows that there are currently 1,910,119 active cases and 118,516 reported fatality around the world. It is the coronavirus effect, and it is crucial to consider it when looking at Iranian reticence to impose quarantine.

 

Under the growing pressure of COVID-19, Iranian regime increased the propaganda reaching some absurd peeks, exemplified in the absurd claim of the US being behind the outbreak (Phillips, 2020). At the same time, the government concentrated its efforts on silencing the news on the outbreak. Farnaz Fassihi and David D. Kirkpatrick, who contacted several Iranian medical workers, reported that “security agents stationed in each hospital had forbidden staff members from disclosing any information about shortages, patients or fatalities related to the coronavirus”.

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