collection 2020
In Search of Lost Dignity
Why Poles continue to Support the Populist Law and Justice Party (PiS)
Internationally Poland's ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party faces harsh criticism for its xenophobic, homophobic and authoritarian character. Seeking an answer to why the populists nevertheless enjoy strong support at home, unveils a deeply divided nation.
By Aleksandra Wróbel
Former Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, brother of the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński. During the celebration of the 9th anniversary of the Smolensk disaster. Source: Kancelaria Sejmu / Łukasz Błasikiewicz, Wikimedia Commons
Warm August Sunday. A big crowd is squeezed between a monumental white building, the green of a recreational football pitch and an improvised parking area. The people, who from a bird’s eye view resemble ants, are scattered around colourful tents, a handful of fire engines and a middle-sized stage. A smaller assembly is gathered around two massive inflatable slides – physically tangible symbols of the congregation’s intergenerational character.
This seemingly innocent family fest has an additional political dimension – it was organised by Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) as part of its campaign ahead of the 2019 parliamentary election. Its format and location – the event took place in Zbuczyn, a Masovian village of less than 2,000 inhabitants – are hardly surprising. The party has for the past four years been championing a conservative, pro-family narrative in which the needs of rural citizens are finally catered for equally as carefully as those of cosmopolitan, urban voters.
Asked about whether his life improved since the 2015 change in government, a middle-aged man in a blue polo shirt has no doubts. ‘For ordinary people, it is absolutely extraordinary that so many positive things for the country and the region happened within such a short time span. (…) Life is different, we look to the future with more confidence,’ he asserts. Judging by the October electoral result – 75% of Zbuczyn residents backed PiS – majority of his neighbours seem to think alike.
All statements made by the participants of family fest in Zbuczyn and authorities of Przytuły have been taken from a video by Onet’s journalists Kamil Dziubka, Daniel Olczykowski and Janusz Szwertner.
In the opinion of Łukasz Pawłowski, an expert from Kultura Liberalna think-tank, it is the excessive emphasis that the Democrats have been putting on identity liberalism that is to blame for aggravating polarisation within the American society. The concept, as introduced by Columbia’s political scientist Mark Lilla, denotes an exaggerated focus on ‘celebrating differences’ and ‘rhetoric of diversity’ that eventually makes the largest chunk of the electorate – in the U.S. case, these are the white working class and those with strong religious convictions – think of themselves as ‘a disadvantaged group whose identity is being threatened and ignored.’ Such alienation of some citizens – inevitably a direct product of the identity politics game – never wins elections, but can easily lose them, professor Lilla warns.
Bart Staszewski, author of LGBT-Free zone project (photo: Przemyslaw Stefaniak)
The Civic Platform should have definitely sought and listened to this advice before it got too late. According to CEC Government Relations, a Warsaw-based political consultancy firm, the party suffered a blow in the 2019 parliamentary election after it had failed to appeal to less-educated voters from the countryside and smaller towns. In contrast, PiS won over 60% of the vote among those with primary and vocational education, as well as has carefully taken account of the fact that more Poles – precisely 14.8 million – live in villages and rural settlements rather than in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants (10.8 million). Moreover, it also managed to woo farmers, the unemployed and pensioners, arguably the greatest beneficiaries of their generous social welfare programmes.
Why did these groups back Law and Justice so decisively? The answer seems to lie in what binds them together – common religion. Although Pew Research Center’s statistic claiming that 87% of the nation identifies as Catholic could to some appear as overreporting (there is
an ongoing debate concerning what constitutes ‘a practising Catholic’ and January 2018 data show that less than 37% of Poles attend Sunday masses regularly), it actually reflects the collective mindset quite well. The majority of Polish people are cultural Catholics, meaning that they remain devoted to traditional values rooted in Christianity, as well as continue to follow the Church’s teaching on most matters.
Asked to elaborate on PiS’s popularity in his commune, Przytuły governor Kazimierz Ramotowski did not have to think twice. ‘[My residents] appreciate such elements of this party’s agenda as the emphasis on family and personal ties. They do not want anyone to interfere with their beliefs or life choices,’ he clarified, implicitly referring to some councils’ efforts to eradicate all signs of ‘the LGBT ideology’ from their neighbourhoods.
Those started when the councillors from Świdnik, an eastern town nearby Lublin, publicly denounced the 12-point LGBT+ rights declaration signed by the Mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski in February 2019. In their view, the document should be regarded as a symptom of approaching ‘cultural revolution,’ which ‘endangers freedom of speech, the authority of families and schools and the freedom of businesses.’ For that reason, its strong potential to ‘annihilate Christian values’ and spread ‘homopropaganda’ can only be combated with strict measures like declaring municipalities, counties and even entire voivodeships ‘LGBT-free
zones.’ ‘Our initiative sends a clear signal to all parents, grandparents and teachers who have lately been reaching out to us,’ comments Świdnik County board member Radosław Brzózka in an interview for a local web portal Dziennik Wschodni. ‘No ideological pressure will be exerted to make them comply with some ideology. They can keep on raising their children the way they wish to,’ he underlines.
As of April 2020, 5 of Poland’s 16 regions – Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie, Małopolskie and Łódzkie Voivodeships – are marked as red on the Atlas of Hate, an interactive map depicting councils that adopted such discriminatory resolutions. This means that there’s already one-third of the country’s population living in ‘LGBT-free zones’ – a development openly welcomed by Marek Jędraszewski, the archbishop of Kraków, who recently made headlines after he had called the LGBT people ‘a rainbow plague.’ As he wrote in a September 2019 pastoral letter cited by conservative LifeSiteNews, their community’s ‘aggressive propaganda’ reminds him of the time ‘when social advancement was guaranteed only to the members of the Communist Party and [Christian] believers were treated like second-class citizens.’ He also indicated that he considered their public activity a threat to ‘the principles of Christian faith.’
To the greatest discontent of most other Polish parties, the Law and Justice, which prides itself on being closely allied with the Church, is more likely to ignore or even endorse similar remarks rather than condemn them. This way it shows its Catholic proponents that it accepts them as they are, thus positioning itself in opposition to the liberal-left elites who despise their religiousness and reluctance to embrace more progressive values. The support that PiS enjoys among less educated voters from rural areas is therefore less so about their conservatism per se, but more about how influential figures make them feel about it by branding them as narrow-minded Obscuropolis residents who long for the return of the Middle Ages. In the opinion of Mark Lilla, such a tactic is a dead-end for liberalism, which should instead approach highly charged symbolically issues touching on sexuality and religion ‘quietly, sensitively and with a proper sense of scale.’
European Dream
These feelings of being disrespected by political opponents are further exacerbated by differences in financial situation. Rural voters, many of whom share a belief that the 1989 transformation has not benefitted everyone equally, look at the lives of urban citizens with a
combination of resentment and jealousy. Driven by the European Dream and the high standard of living it implies, they formed an expectation that the state will at some point attempt to minimise inequality between the inhabitants of cities and villages. In their eyes, improved state of the economy seemed like a perfect opportunity to do so. Clearly, Law and Justice viewed things similarly.
Taking into account how Poland rose to become the EU’s 7th biggest economy after its GDP per capita has surged almost eightfold to €13,558 within the last 30 years, the party decided it was high time to kickstart a large-scale redistribution of wealth by introducing its flagship ‘Family 500+’ programme in 2016. Under the scheme, parents were eligible to receive a tax-free monthly child benefit of PLN 500 (roughly €110 as of April 2, 2020) for the second and any consecutive children until they turn 18. Simple as it was, it served its purposes – according to a press release issued by the European Commission in May 2018, it boosted the number of births and lowered the level of poverty among children. Furthermore, it also contributed to an increase in consumption, thus fuelling the economic growth, World Bank noted.
In the view of governor Kazimierz Ramotowski, whose Przytuły rank among the poorest municipalities in the country, the programme’s results are plain to see. ‘Consider school trips. In previous years, it was common for some pupils to not participate in excursions as they could not afford them. The problem is non-existent now,’ he assures. ‘Everybody’s life is better.’
Paweł Musiałek, an expert from a conservative think-tank Klub Jagielloński, does not dare to challenge this statement. However, as much as he applauds PiS’s generosity and its initial positive effects on citizens, it is also clear to him that the party crossed the line after it had assigned further millions of state funds to the extension of ‘Family 500+’ to first-born children and the so-called ‘13th pension’ – a one-off bonus for retirees. Not only could it be argued that these benefits have been designed to bribe voters (both were announced when the campaign before the European election was starting), but they also, Musiałek contends, ‘overturn the paradigm of effort that society must put into improving its fate.’ In other words, spiralling public expenditure reinforces people’s misguided perception that Poland is already ‘the West,’ which is why it should also be spending like it belongs to the club. Consequently, the nation’s susceptibility to further electoral promises concerning direct financial transfers rises, while there’s no push for Poles to keep working hard so that they complete the historical mission of catching up with the West.
Quo Vadis Poland?
The phenomenon of a significant chunk of electorate feeling alienated due to conservative views or lower level of regional development is not foreign outside Poland – it suffices to mention neighbouring Germany whose eastern part, formerly known as communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), has lately turned to populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) after years of perceived underrepresentation in national politics. Similarly, it is the ‘the silent majority’ who has in 2016 stood up to the scorn of America’s liberal-left elites and brought Trump to power. One can therefore hardly talk about individual cases – this is clearly a worldwide pattern exhibiting how casting a ballot has for many become means to regain dignity. Warsaw is yet another example proving the rule.
‘I’m not necessarily a PiS adherent,’ explains an elderly participant of the family fest in Zbuczyn. ‘I just support those who rule well. And they do (…) We are slowly but successively reclaiming what we’ve lost,’ he concludes.
Does this mean Poland is already lost to populism? Not if post-identity liberalism emerges, Mark Lilla would likely reply.
What is it about Law and Justice’s agenda that makes them continue to support the government and thus implicitly legitimise its constitutionally dubious actions? According to many, the party’s anti-establishment stance, as evidenced by its treatment of ‘the judicial caste,’ definitely plays a part in the process. Others, in turn, point to the introduction of generous social welfare programmes or the protection of traditional values, such as family and prominence of Catholicism.
Who’s right? Both and neither, it appears. While each of these explanations makes some sense on its own, the only truly overarching answer to the question of why the hearts of Poles remain conquered by PiS combines them all and lies in the capacious concept of dignity.
Silent Majority
‘The village is what gave rise to our values, it is the source of Polishness,’ declared Jarosław Kaczyński, Law and Justice’s chairman and the de facto leader of Poland, at the picnic. In between conversations with voters, including hostesses with red bead necklaces who were offering him traditional pierogi, he kept emphasising his conviction that PiS was inherently different from the previously ruling liberal-Christian democratic coalition.
‘In Poland, there are still people – they have even lately held power for 8 years – who share a Soviet-rooted belief that development should proceed at the expense of the countryside,’ he thundered. ‘Is Poland going to take the path of sustainable development, community and the citizens’ equal rights or will it go back to where it was heading before?’
Similar statements are very typical of Kaczyński and his party loyalists, who routinely leverage the country’s extreme political polarisation to mobilise own electorate. As the 2015-2019 term and the campaign that preceded it have clearly shown, referring to the predecessors appears as one of PiS’s most effective tools to play identity politics. Considering how the Civic Platform (PO) and its junior partner Polish People’s Party (PSL) ruled for almost a decade, they have had enough time to implement reforms that are now rated at best ambiguously. Examples include their decisions to raise the retirement age and lower the
school starting age to 6 years old. Moreover, the coalition also damaged its reputation after journalists had exposed its politicians’ involvement in numerous scandals, for instance ‘the wild reprivatisation.’
It is no wonder that Law and Justice strives to maintain the memory of its opponents’ not-so-glorious moments – sending more or less gentle reminders of their legacy only stirs negative emotions that the party can employ to its advantage. The family fest in Zbuczyn serves as yet another proof that this strategy is bearing fruits. ‘Everything the previous government was doing was against Poland,’ claims a white-haired man in a plaid shirt. ‘Poland would no longer exist if they stayed in power,’ agrees another picnicker, a former driver with a moustache.
The figure that would undoubtedly provoke their greatest discontent if mentioned is the prime minister of the 2007-2014 cabinet, Donald Tusk. Despite quitting Polish politics to become the president of the European Council over 5 years ago, he is to this day resented by rural and less affluent voters. ‘I think it’s already sort of a national saying. The ‘Tusk’s fault’ expression. (…) Whenever something’s wrong, it is Tusk to be blamed,’ explains Elżbieta Jolanta Rybicka, the village administrator of Przytuły, a north-eastern municipality where PiS regularly receives about 90% of the votes. ‘Here, PiS is pretty much sacred and people will go to great lengths to justify any despicable acts it ever commits,’ she adds.
Such unconditional support for the favoured party, as combined with manifested and deep hostility to its main contender, is not a Polish-specific phenomenon and has already been extensively studied by researchers like UC Berkeley’s Alrie Russel Hochschild. The sociologist has in 2016 published her most famous work – a book entitled ‘Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right’ – in which she documents escalating hatred between America’s two clashing political tribes, as well as shows how it contributed to the radicalisation of the Republican Party. If it wasn’t for the latter process, they would have failed to fully accommodate Middle Radical Americans (MARS), otherwise known as ‘the silent majority.’ Accordingly, they would have lost the 2016 elections, which gave them the Congress majority and put Donald Trump in the White House.
Similarly, Poland’s two biggest political forces – socially-conservative and economically left-wing Law and Justice (PiS) and liberal Civic Platform (PO) – have since 2005 been
competing over power. It, however, wasn’t until the 2010 Smolensk plane crash when the rivalry between them turned so toxic that any chances for future agreement became jeopardised. The reason was that many of those associated with PiS believed the catastrophe was actually the outcome of an assassination plot. Contrarily, PO leaders and proponents, including the aforementioned PM Tusk, rejected such theory and started to publicly ridicule those spreading it. As a result, its advocates began to feel increasingly ‘abused, forgotten and mistreated,’ as National Public Radio’s Sam Senders puts it – just like ‘the silent majority’ of Trump voters whom Hillary Clinton once labelled as ‘deplorables.’ When it comes to Warsaw’s two warring camps, it only went downhill from that point on.
Rainbow Plague
About the Author
Aleksandra Wróbel, Poland
Originally from a middle-sized southeast town of Kielce, Aleksandra is a Polish communications professional whose nomadic mindset demonstrates itself in her experience of living and studying in 5 different European countries until the age of 25.
